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Abstract 
Ethics seems to be of increasing concern for researchers in Higher Education 
Institutes and funding bodies demand ever more transparent and robust ethics 
procedures. While we agree that an ethical approach to fieldwork in religion is 
critical, we take issue with the approach that ethics committees and reviews 
adopt in assessing the ethicality of proposed research projects. We identify that 
the approach to research ethics is informed by consequentialism – the 
consequences of actions, and Kantianism – the idea of duty. These two ethical 
paradigms are amenable to the prevailing audit culture of HE. We argue that 
these ethical paradigms, while might be apposite for bio-medical research, are 
not appropriate for fieldwork in religion. However, because ethics should be a 
crucial consideration for all research, it is necessary to identify a different 
approach to ethical issues arising in ethnographic research. We suggest that a 
virtue ethics approach – concerned with character – is much more consistent 
with the situated, relational and ongoing nature of ethnographic research. 
 




Ethics is taken increasingly seriously in the Higher Education (HE) sector. All universities now 
require researchers to acquire ethical approval before undertaking any primary research 
that involves human participation. Both Higher Education Institutions (HEI) and funding 
bodies such as the Research Council UK (RSUK) have ethical guidelines and/or codes of 
conduct. All research that involves any form of human (or animal) participation now must 
gain ethical approval before any research can begin. We address two issues in this paper: 
first, we consider the main drivers for the increasing concern with research ethics; and 
second the philosophical underpinnings for research ethics. We identify two philosophical 
underpinnings to the current approach to ethics. The first, consequentialism, focuses on the 
consequences of actions. The second, derived from the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804), emphasises the idea of duty and usually involves a claim that there are absolute 
ethical injunctions that are not determined by either intent or consequences. We conclude 
by suggesting that these ethical paradigms are problematic for fieldwork in religion.  We 
advocate adopting a virtue ethics approach when considering the ethical issues of 
ethnographic research in religion. Rather than focusing on either duty to abstract moral 
laws or the consequences of action, virtue ethics focuses instead on the character of the 
moral agent, and on those virtues deemed appropriate to moral agency. 
 
Before addressing these issues, it is important to state – it might even be considered an 
ethical imperative to do so – that one of the co-authors has been Chair of the Faculty of Arts 
Ethics Committee and a member of the University Ethics Committee at the University of  
Wolverhampton since 2012. This paper is based on the experiences of being both an active 
ethnographic researcher as well as chairing the Faculty Ethics Committee. In addition, we 
interviewed three active post-doctoral researchers who are located in humanities and social 
sciences, and one researcher in health studies at the University of Wolverhampton.   
 
In recent years there has been a move towards creating a consistent ethics policy across our 
University and increasing level of detail is required for ethical reviews of proposed research. 
For example, there are heightened concerns about data security and more specific 
instructions on the protocols for recruiting research participants. All of these details now 
demanded for ethical approval are determined at the University level. However, the 
University’s ethical ethos and procedures are themselves embedded in the ethical context 
of the HE sector and wider cultural understandings of ethics.  
 
Heidi Armbruster and Anna Lærke (2008: 2) observe that ‘concerns with research ethics 
have clearly intensified over recent years, in large part as a symptom of audit cultures’. 
We argue that the imperative of the audit culture entails that consequentialist and Kantian 
perspectives are the prevailing paradigms in assessing the ethical aspects of research in the 
UK HE sector. Consequentialism assumes that weighing the consequences of our actions 
ought to be of prior ethical concern, whereas Kantianism assumes a duty to the ‘Moral Law’ 
incumbent upon any rational creature, be they human or alien. Part of the attraction of 
these two dominant theories of ethics has been the idea that they could be ‘codified’, 
thereby holding out the possibility of both practical applicability and auditability. Practical 
applicability, because codification involves the derivation of universal rules, or ‘codes of 
conduct’ which adherents of either theory could follow. The classic consequentialist version 
of such a rule is, of course, the utilitarian ‘Greatest Happiness Principle’ [GHP] which exhorts 
us to ‘act so as to maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. The Kantian 
version, on the other hand, entails identifying the rules (codes, laws) adherence to which 
constitutes moral behaviour. (These rules traditionally take the form of categorical 
imperatives – ‘Always tell the truth – rather than hypothetical imperatives – ‘Only tell the 
truth when it is expedient to do so’). The possibility of auditing these theories follows from 
the codification process itself. This is very clear in the case of utilitarianism’s GHP which 
invites moral agents to compare the amount of happiness (or pleasure, or ‘good’ etc.) which 
may result from alternative courses of action (leaving aside the complex practicalities – 
amply illustrated by  Jeremy Bentham’s ‘felicific calculus’ – of actually carrying out such 
calculations). 
 
The hegemony of consequentialism and Kantianism is reinforced by a reliance on the bio-
medical model of ethics. The bio-medical ethical model is, rightly, concerned with risk-
aversion and attempting to mitigate harm and maximise benefits. We consider whether this 
approach is suitable for ethnographic fieldwork generally, and for fieldwork in religion in 
particular. Both the demand for more details in ethics reviews in HE institutions and a 
consequentialist/ Kantian approach to ethics is commensurate with the risk-averse audit 
culture of universities in the UK. However, neither the consequentialist approach nor a 
Kantian perspective, determined by the ethical concerns of medical research, are apposite 
paradigms for considering the ethics of ethnographic fieldwork in religion. As the human 
geographers Sarah Dyer and David Demeritt observe (2008: 54), ‘we stand in a different 
relationship to our research participants than doctors do’. Dyer and Demeritt have identified 
the salient point that ethics is primarily a relational concept, and we suggest that a virtue 
ethics approach is a more useful way of thinking about relationships between the 
ethnographer and research participants who are members of faith communities. The 
objectivist, impersonal nature of consequentialism and Kantianism is challenged by virtue 
ethics. This is not to say that virtue ethics is, by contrast, subjectivist; it is to say that it takes 
the situated nature of human existence seriously in a way that neither consequentialism nor 
Kantianism can do, and this situated and contextual nature of human relationships must be 
taken into account when undertaking ethnographic research into religion. 
 
What drives the ethics agenda? 
HE in both its main activities – teaching and research – is increasingly shaped, as with 
aspects of the wider society, by an audit culture. This audit culture is derived from a 
neoliberal agenda which has informed ‘an imperative felt by higher education institutions 
and governments to find ways of measuring and benchmarking research quality’ (Besley 
2006: 815). This audit culture has a number of aspects. Firstly, it is underpinned by a 
positivist approach to research, and this is therefore not appropriate for ethnographic 
research on religious communities which, in the vast majority of cases, is shaped by an 
interpretivist approach. Most researchers who undertake fieldwork in religion are informed 
by what Max Weber termed verstehen, which is often translated as understanding. Weber 
(1978: 9–10) argued that ‘understanding involves the interpretive grasp of the meaning’ of 
the context, and that ‘the processes of action which seem to an observer to be the same or 
similar may fit into exceedingly various complexes of motive in the case of the actual actor’. 
In other words, understanding entails a grasp of the subjective meaning of actions, and this 
cannot easily be audited.  
 
The audit culture, informed by a positivist outlook, assumes a uniform ethical culture 
practice and process, which it then seeks to promote a ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy. However, 
at the University of Wolverhampton we have four Faculties - Arts; Social Sciences; Science 
and Engineering; Education, Health and Wellbeing.  Are the ethical issues of someone 
researching in health and education the same as a researcher in humanities or the social 
sciences? It is of note that all three interviewees in the humanities and social sciences 
tended to be sceptical about the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy. So for example several of our 
interviewees indicated that ‘there are clear differences between the science disciplines and 
the social science disciplines’ (personal interview 01/06/17). 
 
We suggest that the ethical issues and dilemmas for fieldwork, and particularly 
ethnographical research of religious communities, are not necessarily the same as those 
researching in engineering, health or education. Not only is there no uniform approach 
across academic disciplines, but also there is no consistent ethical approach within the 
academic study of religion. This is not to say that religious studies researchers should 
abandon ethical considerations, but we argue that a different way of thinking about 
research needs to be considered for fieldwork in religion.  We specifically argue for a virtue 
ethics approach to researching religious communities. However, before detailing the virtue 
ethics approach, we will identify the philosophical paradigms that we perceive as 
underpinning the ‘one-size- fits-all’ agenda and informs most, if not all, ethical guidelines in 
Higher Education Institutes.  
 
As we have observed, consequentialist and Kantian approaches to ethics underpin and drive 
the ethical agenda in research in the UK. For example, the Economic and Social Research 
Council’s (ESRC) ethical guidelines suggest that: ‘Research should aim to maximize benefit 
for individuals and society and minimize risk and harm’ – clearly a consequentialist idea, 
whilst later on there is the Kantian exhortation to respect ‘rights and dignity of individuals 
and groups’. This consequentialist approach is indicated by our interviewee in health studies  
who suggests: 
 
If you are coming with a proposal, trying to think of all the things that could 
possibly go wrong. The question is – ‘is it quite likely to go wrong, is it almost 
never going to go wrong?’ Then you sort of measure what the consequences of 
going wrong will be. (personal interview 05/06/17) 
 
While, this is a perfectly laudable aspiration for research that involves physical 
interventions, we question if ‘measuring consequences’ is the right philosophical approach 
to ethnographic fieldwork in religion. While, of course things can go wrong in all research, 
the ethical challenges in ethnographic research are different to those encountered in bio-
medical research. For example, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2000) records how when she 
returned after 20 years to the village in Ireland where she did her fieldwork for her prize 
winning book Saints, Scholars and Schizophrenics, she was forced to leave by the irate 
villagers. Scheper-Hughes (2000: 119) reports one of the villagers accusing her: ‘Admit it. 
You wrote a book to please yourself at our expense. You ran us down girl, you ran us 
down.’ The ire of the villagers was caused by what they perceived as being an unfair 
representation of their lives in the published monograph.  
 
Ethical guidelines 
All Higher Education Institutes now have ethics policies, guidelines and processes to review 
the ethical aspects of proposed research. Funding bodies, such as the UK Research Council, 
are increasingly demanding a transparent ethical review process as well as having their own 
ethical guidelines. For the purposes of this paper we will look briefly at the Ethical 
Guidelines at the University of Wolverhampton and the primary source for these guidelines 
– the United Kingdom Research Integrity Office (UKRIO).  It would be wrong to assume that 
the Ethics Guidelines are exclusively informed by a consequentialist approach.  For example, 
The University’s web pages on ethics suggest that ethics is concerned with ‘amongst other 
aspects: what kinds of lives we should lead’ and ‘what qualities of character we should 
develop’. These concerns suggest a virtue ethics approach. However, as it is almost 
impossible to audit ‘kinds of life’ and ‘character’, consequentialist and Kantian approaches, 
which are more amenable to calculation, dominate the ethical ethos and ethical guidelines 
in HE. A Kantian approach to ethics is apparent in the University of Wolverhampton 
guidelines with statements like ‘what actions are right and wrong’. A consequentialist 
paradigm is apparent in phrases in the ethical guidelines such as: ‘Ethics as a subject area 
traditionally covers topics such as the overall harms and benefits of research’ (University of 
Wolverhampton 2017). This agenda of ensuring potential benefits of research raises a 
number of problematic issues. Even when undertaking physical intervention in health 
research, harms and benefits are not straight forward to calculate. When considering harm, 
the researcher in health studies indicated that it is problematic to assess the value of 
extending life in relationship to the quality of life. In some instances, the participant’s 
evaluation – say a faint chance of extending their life – will be different to that of the 
researcher who is aware of the low possibility of extending life and the possible harmful 
effects of the experimental treatment (personal interview 05/06/17). 
 
Furthermore, researchers are obliged to complete ethics forms and obtain ethical approval 
prior to entering the field. Consequently, we have to try and calculate this benefit/harm 
ratio before carrying out any research. Joan Cassell (1982, cited in Israel and Hay 2006: 106) 
observes: 
 
Cataloguing potential harms and weighing them against benefits before research 
is carried out becomes primarily an exercise in creativity, with little applicability 
to the real ethical difficulties that may emerge in research. 
 
This imperative to anticipate consequences tends to encourage a perception that ethics is a 
one-off procedure, rather than an ongoing aspect of research. 
 
When considering benefits, the question arises for whose benefits is research? Leaving aside 
the obvious benefits to the researchers themselves – for example that good research will 
benefit the researcher’s career and academic reputation – benefits can broadly be classified 
in terms of either societal beneficence or specific beneficence. 
 
Societal beneficence manifests in the imperative to demonstrate impact in research. Mark 
Israel (2015:2) indicates that ethical research ‘offers the potential to increase the sum of 
good in the world’. This suggests that societal beneficence implies a utilitarian approach to 
research ethics. Benefits to society as a whole are often very difficult to establish, even 
within medical and scientific research. What benefits the wider society could be detrimental 
to particular individuals and/or groups.  One of the main criticisms of a simplistic form of 
consequentialism is that the benefits for the many may well harm the few. This has 
sometimes been referred to as the tyranny of the majority and it became a serious 
consideration when some of the medical experiments performed by the Nazi regime came 
to light. However, we have come a long way from condoning torture in the name of 
scientific knowledge. Consequently, ethical guidelines always refer to individuals. For 
example, the University of Wolverhampton’s ethics guidelines indicate that ‘researchers 
should ensure the dignity, rights, safety and wellbeing of all involved in research and avoid 
unreasonable risk or harm to research subjects’. It is of note that the guidelines refer to 
research subjects, suggesting a lack of agency to the individuals and a relationship of power 
between researcher and researched. The current preferred signifier is research participant, 
suggesting a more equal relationship between researcher and researched, and that 
individuals are actively involved in the research process, and are not merely passive objects 
of intellectual scrutiny.  
 
As well as considering societal beneficence research ethics considers specific beneficence – 
or the benefits that one’s research brings to specific individuals or groups.  There are a 
range of specific groups and individuals that might be considered as potential beneficiaries 
of research, these include: the particular higher education institute of the researcher, the 
academic discipline(s) and of course research participants themselves. However, when one 
looks at ethical guidelines there is little to suggest that research should benefit participants. 
Although there are some types of research, such as action research, that aspire to bring 
positive change to the specific constituency being studied, most research aims to add to the 
extant body of knowledge and understanding of a particular topic, so that the benefits are 
rather more diffuse.  
 
Researchers can bring unintended consequences for the group or individual being 
researched. These consequences might be beneficial. For example, academic publications 
about a specific group may legitimize that group, and give that group a greater public 
profile. This might possibly bring benefits to certain groups, for example extreme right wing 
groups that hold an Islamaphobic ideology, that the researcher might not wish to advantage 
in any way. However, in the context of auditing consequences, researchers are more 
impelled to consider potential harms, hence the imperatives for informed consent and data 
security, which are considered to be crucial to protecting research participants. In the 
information about informed consent the University of Wolverhampton’s ethics web pages 
suggest that researchers must ‘consider if there is any possibility of either physical or 
psychological distress’, when planning their research.   
 
The University of Wolverhampton’s policy on research ethics, suggests a list of seven 
principles that should guide research: excellence; honest; integrity; cooperation; 
accountability; training and skills; and care, safety and respect. These principles are 
primarily derived from UKRIO an independent charity established in 2006 to ‘Promote the 
good governance, management and conduct of academic, scientific and medical research’ 
(UKRIO 2017). While this is not the place to unpack these principles in any great detail, there 
are two important points to consider. Firstly – the introduction states that ‘these Principles 
aim to encourage all involved in research to consider the wider consequences of their work’ 
(UKRIO 2017). Again, this emphasizes a consequentialist approach to research. Secondly, the 
focus is more on the nature of the academic endeavour, rather than on moral concern for 
others. For example, the principle of excellence indicates that ‘researchers should strive for 
excellence when conducting research and aim to produce and disseminate work of the 
highest quality’. Under the heading ‘honesty’ researchers are advised to ‘do their utmost to 
ensure the accuracy of data and results, acknowledge the contributions of others, and 
neither engage in misconduct nor conceal it’ (UKRIO 2017).  
 
Here we can distinguish between what might be identified as research conduct – which 
although it has an ethical dimension, is not the same as research ethics.  The term integrity 
is key here. While the UKRIO does not ignore moral concern for others, the focus is on the 
conduct of the research process – for example not fabricating data.  The reference to 
excellence in the UKRIO’s and the University of Wolverhampton’s list of principles alludes to 
another issue, namely what is the relationship between ethics and methodology. Ethics is of 
course primarily, although not exclusively about methodology. However, methodology – the 
how of research – is not co-extensive with ethics. This raises a dilemma for ethics 
committees – namely at what point should we comment on researcher’s methodology that 
is not say directly dishonest etc. The principles of excellence, integrity and accountability 
suggest that ethics is as much concerned with the reputation of the University as it is with 
the moral welfare of research participants. Incompetently designed research, for example a 
poorly composed questionnaire, which is not designed in a way that achieves research 
objectives, could be considered an ethical issue, as it reflects badly on the University, and 
could be construed as wasting the time of research participants. 
 
It is no coincidence that out of the 13 members of the advisory panel of the UKRIO five have 
a background in medicine and health studies.  Unsurprisingly, the bio-medical model is 
dominant in the UKRIO’s principles. The bio-ethical model of research ethics, the focus on 
consequences and the imperative of the audit culture gives rise to two major issues when 
considering the nature of ethnographic fieldwork. First, it suggests that ethics is a sort of 
one-off event. Once the researcher has had their ethical application audited by the 
committee this encourages the idea that there is no further requirement to consider ethical 
issues. It is apparent that many researchers at all levels – from undergraduate to post-
doctoral – consider the demand for ethical approval as an obstacle to negotiate at the 
beginning of research rather than something that should be reflected upon throughout the 
research process. Second, despite the change of terminology from research subjects to 
research participants, it tends to encourage a perception of individuals as objects of 
research. 
 
While we have some issues with the ways in which the bio-ethics drives the ethical agenda, 
we do agree with the importance of a process of ethical scrutiny. We suggest this more from 
the perspective of having applied for ethics approval, than from the point of view of being 
the Chair of the Ethics Committee. Certainly our experiences of requesting ethics approval 
for our own research has made us reflect on what we hoped to achieve in our fieldwork and 
how  we went about that fieldwork. In other words, consideration of ethical issues should 
not be simply seen as a one-off obstacle to research, but an ongoing aspect of research that 
contributes, not only to the usual ethics issues – lack of harm, confidentiality, informed 
consent and so on, but is integral to the development of becoming reflexive researchers. We 
agree with Marlene De-Laine (2000: 17) that the bio-ethic model underpinned by a 
consequentialist approach to ethics tend to focus on ‘what we do to others, and tends to 
neglect the wider moral and social responsibility of simply being a researcher’.   
 
A new paradigm – becoming a virtuous researcher 
Considering being a researcher suggests that one enters into a particular style of moral 
relationships with others, and this is particularly significant for ethnographic fieldwork. 
Ethnographic relationships should, as De Laine (2000: 17) suggests, be characterized by the 
researcher ‘who wants to be with rather than look at the other’. This imperative ‘to be with’ 
rather than simply ‘look at’ research participants requires researchers to be ‘morally 
involved, self-aware, self-reflexive’ (De Laine 2000: 28).  What De Laine fails to draw out in 
her otherwise excellent book, is the philosophical approach that should underpin the call for 
the morally involved, self-aware and reflexive researcher.  It is here that we believe a 
consideration of virtue ethics can come into play.  
 
Rather than seeking to root ethics in abstract, unhistorical rationality, virtue ethics begins 
with situated human beings and asks what virtues are required for human flourishing in the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. The idea of ‘virtue’, of course, is not a simple 
one. There are, for example, many potential virtues we might admire – honesty, integrity, 
bravery, fairness, to name but a few. What is more, time and place may impact upon which 
virtues we think admirable. As MacIntyre points out, Homeric Greece admired the martial 
virtues, whilst for Aristotle the Athenian gentleman is the epitome of the virtuous man. For 
Aquinas, the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity are paramount, whilst for Benjamin 
Franklin the salient virtues included cleanliness, frugality, and industry (MacIntyre, 2007: 
182-183). 
What all these different accounts of virtue have in common, however, is that they represent 
traits of character formed in a complex relationship with one’s society, community, family, 
religion, and so on. Thus, for virtue ethicists, morality is always grounded in a particular time 
and place, and character is formed, not in the abstract, but in the interaction between what 
MacIntyre (2007:187) calls the ‘narrative order of a single life’ and the wider ‘moral 
traditions’ in which the self is located. Character is therefore at one and the same time a 
project of self-understanding, and of seeking to understand one’s place in the world. It is, 
MacIntyre (2007: 219) says, ‘a quest’ rather than a given.  As Charles Taylor, (1989: 47) 
echoing MacIntyre, puts it: human existence ‘can never be exhausted for us by what we are, 
because we are always also changing and becoming’. This, of course, is no less the case in 
our role as researchers.  
The attentiveness to one’s self and its environment, and openness to change and 
development this entails, can also be seen in terms of a key Aristotelian virtue: phronesis, 
which has been translated variously as ‘practical wisdom’, ‘practical rationality’ or ‘practical 
judgement’. Before we turn to an account of phronesis as a way of approaching research, 
we should say a little more about the idea of virtue itself. 
We can, of course, simply list virtues – honesty, integrity and so on – though which, if any, 
are to be considered morally salient requires more than this. After all, virtues may conflict – 
if frugality is a virtue (as it is for Franklin) then it might conflict with liberality (one of 
Aristotle’s key virtues). We could, of course, ask more generally ‘what is virtue?’ to which 
the response is often along the lines that virtues ‘are not only character traits but 
excellences of character’ (Hursthouse, 2002: 12). The presence of the idea of ‘excellence’ 
here is intended to convey a striving, not for perfection (would we even know what that is?) 
but for the ‘right action’, which is to say, the ethically appropriate action. The Dickens 
character Mrs Jellyby from Bleak House is a philanthropist who busies herself setting up a 
mission to help the poor children of Africa. Yet so busy is she in pursuing this goal that she 
neglects her own children. She is generous, we might say, but generous to a fault 
(Hursthouse, 2002: 13). In other words, the mechanical implementation of the virtues is not 
the mark of a truly virtuous person. The truly virtuous person is one who displays phronesis. 
Hursthouse (2016, online) describes phronesis as a form of ‘situational appreciation’ 
defined as ‘the capacity to recognize, in any particular situation, those features of it that 
are morally salient’. But this capacity does not spring fully-formed from the rational 
centres of the brain: it is rather a capacity that must be learned, developed and honed in 
actual contexts facing real issues (which, of course, is one of the reasons we do not 
generally treat young children as fully competent moral agents since they have yet to 
develop the capacity). This capacity for judgement, as Ess acknowledges, ‘is one that is 
capable of learning from its mistakes’ (Ess 2009: 208). Phronesis is therefore consistent 
with an interpretivist approach to research, as both acknowledge the contingent, 
contextual and situated nature of meaning. 
It would also be a mistake to think that, once one has learned how to exercise the 
capacity, then one has achieved virtue. This is because the sheer complexity of the 
actual situations in which we find ourselves called upon to make ethical decisions 
precludes the simple invocation of a previously learned mode of action. Thus, virtue 
ethics acknowledges the requirement for a ‘mindset’ rather than a codified set of 
principles. A mindset, moreover, that requires ‘the wholehearted acceptance of a 
distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action’ (Hursthouse: 2016) rather than 
simply the maximization of happiness, or duty to an abstract moral law. The ability to 
learn from one’s mistakes means that the cultivation of the capacity for ethical 
judgement ‘is an on-going task’ (Ess 2009: 209). 
It should be obvious by now that virtue ethics is not auditable in the sense which current 
ethical thinking around research demands. As the knowledge and experience of the 
researcher – and of the research community – grows, so the possible range of responses 
to the subject of research develops, too. The current research ethics culture assumes a 
determinate set of identifiable risks, in advance of the research itself. But immersion in 
any religious community one is researching may throw up unanticipated issues and 
problems, which must be faced no matter how much one may have pondered these 
possibilities in advance. Consequently, the assumptions which virtue ethicists make 
concerning the nature of moral thinking accord much better with the actual practices of 
social science research in general, and religious studies ethnography in particular, than do 
those of either consequentialism, or Kantianism.  
 
Reflections on fieldwork. 
Ethnographic research of religious communities is about establishing and maintaining 
relationships, and consequently ethics must be integrated throughout the research process. 
Ethics must therefore be construed as an ongoing process and not a one-off procedure, and 
this is not readily recognized by the positivist bio-medical model with its emphasis on 
consequences, duty and risk-aversity, and which can have no real understanding of the 
nature and ethical challenges of ethnographic fieldwork. However, a virtue ethics approach 
that fosters phronesis, is more compatible with Max Weber’s concept of verstehen and is 
much more likely to inculcate an understanding of the ongoing and contextual nature of 
ethics. It is apparent from our interviewees that the current research ethics procedures and 
principles miss two significant aspects of the actual experience of conducting ethnographic 
research: the impact on the researchers themselves, and the complexities of the 
communities, practices or ways of life which are the object of research. As we shall see, it is 
in navigating these complexities that the limitations of the risk-averse model of research 
ethics, favoured by the audit culture, become most apparent. It is also, as we shall argue, 
where the idea of phronesis is potentially of greatest value. 
 
As one of our interviewees succinctly put it when discussing the dominant framework for 
auditing ethics in research: “there is the kind of underlying assumption that research ethics 
consists only of people we research” (personal interview 05/06/17). This is not to deny that 
conducting research may bring harm to those who comprise the focus of the research, 
whether individuals, groups or communities. Nor is it to deny the importance of seeking to 
minimize such harms, insofar as they can be anticipated. But to exclude the researcher from 
the scope of harm is to fail to see research holistically. One of our interviewees, for 
example, described the experience of interviewing a group of emotionally traumatised 
young men. An experienced researcher, with many previous interviews under his belt, he 
nevertheless found himself deeply affected by the revelations of his interviewees. As he 
reported: “when I actually started this research I was just so completely unprepared for this 
that it affected me quite significantly” (personal interview 05/06/17). 
That he did not anticipate that he too would experience emotional trauma as a result of 
their harrowing revelations is not a failure on his part to correctly anticipate the risks, as the 
audit model might imply. Even if, in broad terms, the nature of those revelations could have 
been anticipated in advance of the interviews, one might still not be in a position to 
anticipate one’s own reaction to that content. This, of course, is to recognize that 
researchers who find themselves in situations for which there is no obvious precedent, and 
for which they must think on their feet, exemplify the process of phronesis. Rather than see 
it as a failure on the part of this researcher to anticipate the consequences of conducting 
these interviews, it is rather an example in which the researcher, encountering a unique set 
of circumstances, both learns something about his own reactions, and strives to develop 
strategies for coping with the unexpected. Phronesis is therefore as much about self-
knowledge as it is about acquiring knowledge of others. 
Any researcher attempting to cross boundaries between one religion and another, or 
between specific religions and the wider communities in which they exist, or even within 
religious communities where gender or caste barriers might exist, may find it difficult to 
anticipate the nature of the risks – to the religion as a whole, or to groups, castes or 
individual members within that religion – of that research. This is especially difficult if one is 
also an insider, a member of the religion one is seeking to research. One of our interviewees 
described these difficulties thus: 
The first time I went to do research I was accused of being a spy. It took me, I’d 
probably say it took me a good few years actually to get to the level where I am now, 
where I can walk into a Gurdwara, a mandir, a Ravidas place of worship, and they 
actually respect me because they know the level of research I’m doing. But that 
didn’t happen overnight. It’s a very, very long process. [personal interview 
1/06/2017] 
The fact that this is a ‘very, very long process’ indicates why the risk-averse, audit-driven 
approach, with its assumption that risks can be clearly identified in advance, is so 
problematic for ethnographic research. Much is at stake in such research – not only for 
those specific individuals who are the object of such research, but also for the communities 
of which they are members and for the researcher herself – and it is not by any means 
always clear where the risks may lie. Navigating this terrain is actually to exercise phronesis. 
Conclusion 
While virtues cannot be audited in the same way as consequences and duties. It is clear that 
there is no likelihood that the hegemony of consequentialism and Kantian ethics will 
disappear soon –  and it likely that in this risk averse context ethics panels will continue to 
audit applications for ethical approval based on perceived balance between risks and 
benefits. Nonetheless, we conclude that a virtue ethics approach to research is more 
consistent with the relational, situated, complex and changing nature of fieldwork in 
religion. We do not envisage this paper as offering any definite answers – as that in many 
ways in antithetical to the concept of phronesis and the approach that we are advocating. 
However, we do hope that this paper will begin an ongoing conversation about the nature 
of ethics, which will foster not only better relationships in the field, but also better research.  
 
We end with positing three broad interrelated questions to act as catalysts for this 
conversation. First, what are the virtues that are needed to develop ethical research?  This 
must come with the proviso that virtues are not like a qualification, but must be understood 
as a set of complex interactions between the virtue per se, the character of the researcher 
and the context of the research. Second, how can ethics committees ensure ethical 
research, if virtue ethics is more concerned with character and dispositions than principles 
that can be audited? Third, how do we develop phronesis as researchers? One of the ways 
in which we might think about this depends on different perceptions of the scope of ethics. 
It often seems, all too frequently from the perspective of the audit culture, that ethical 
considerations are ‘bolt-on’ elements of the research process. This attitude is, we believe, 
encouraged by the bio-medical research committee model which takes the auditability of 
risk as its primary concern. But as one of our respondees noted, in what might be described 
as classic Aristotelian terms, ethics is not solely about how one plans and executes a piece of 
research, but is instead concerned with ‘how you live your life’ (personal interview 
01/06/17). To recognize this is also to recognize that, far from being a superficial, ‘bolt-on’ 
aspect of designing a research project, ethics ‘goes all the way down’ (Hursthouse, 2016: 
online). That is to say, a disposition towards the virtues – whatever these virtues may be – is 
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